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The meaning of 'theory'
As a term of art, kocial theory' is a distinctly recent Invention. No such term exists In English or in any other language before the twentieth centuryI and even io the twentieth century it is not common before about the 1940s. Auguste *Comte coined the term sucioI0-gie in France in the 1840s, but 'sociology' too did not gain widespread currency as a term uatll after 1900. However, the two separate words 'socfal* and 'theory' are very ancient in origin. An initial lookat theix etymologies willglw us somedues to theirmeanlag as a coniolned pair.
Our 
G
~eant 'contem~lation'. In thewritings of the philosopher M o t l e , &&a referred to contemplation of the cosmos. It contrasted withepm&, from which our word 'pra&eJ derives. Praxis for the Greeks referred to human -'way of acttng and conducting their lives on this earth, in the Immediate everyday wodd. Clearly* this ancient Greek understanding of M a differs horn most common uses of the word 'theory' today. The Greek word thearla had g different set of connotations from e m o d e r n linkages of theory with 'scientific construction'. m y we tend to think of ' a theoryr as belna a 'scientific construct' or a 'scientific model'. In contrast. thfor the Greeks did not itself mean science.
--Rather, it meant rePection on science: reff ection on the value of saence, as one mode of contem~latin~ thecosmos amongothers-alongside art, myth, reliRfon. and the most general discipline of thinkinp; that the Greeks called 'philoso~hy~, Other sub@ctsofstudp, such ashistory, archaeolo~, or an criticism, can aIsa be sciences. In French, the subject5 known in English as the 'humanities' are called Ies sciences Aumnines, while in German the humanities are known as the *Gpistenvissmd~ofim-'sciences of the mlnd', or "sciences of thc works of the human mind'.
The particular association between scienceand natural science in English reflccls a series oldeveloprnents in ea~lp modern European history in which a number of precedents were set by the emergence of physics and astronomy in the seventeenth centurv and the emergence of chemistry and biolo~y in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From around L k k A g h t e i e h t e e n t Y l r y . a variety of atternpfi were made t o e thc a . I . k N c t r m a t l r i a a n l r t * t l i t n f f i w - environmental destruction, or sexism or racism remains a different activity from the activity of campaigning for policies to abolish them. The two kinds of activity depend on each other in very real and practical ways; but they remain distinct from each other. Social theory is not activism and cannot be turned into activism; it depends on practice and is guided by practice but is not the same as practice. This is at once its strength and its limitation. To appreciate these ways in which social theory entails both an attitude of involvement in social life and an attitude of detachment from social life, we need to turn now to a range of issues bound up with the role of 'facts', 'values,' and 'objectivity' in social science.
sclencesthcmselves.amu w h m w h i c h n~w i r a s c i e n c e . -t h e humanities and

'Facts', 'values', and 'objectivity'
On one level, all social science is a search for facts, for 'social facts'. The Latin root of our word 'fact' means 'something made' or 'something done', from factum, the participle of the verb facere, 'to make'. In addition, our modern sense of the word 'fact' refers to any state of affairs that is real, definite, and incontrovertible.
In these two senses of the word 'fact', it is a fact that six million Jews died in the Holocaust; and it is also a fact that ten thousand Palestinians died in the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. What is important in these two historical facts is less the exact numerical statistic than the fact that something real, definite, and incontrovertible happened and was made to happen by human agency. The Shoah and the Nakba (the evacuation of Palestine) are not legends, myths, or fantasies; they are facts. They did not happen of their own accord or by the agency of supernatural forces or spirits; they were done and made by real human actors acting in definite social-historical conditions which can be documented, observed, analysed, and interpreted.
However, the problem of facts for social science is that facts only ever appear to us laden with values. The Shoah and the Nakba are significant to us from the standpoint of moral and political values: they stand out to us precisely because they are an affront to human values. They concern us because they are events involving sufferings and crimes which ought not to have occurred. Here the difference between facts and values can be understood as the difference between the world as it is, or was, and the world as we would like it to be, or not to be. How the world is is one thing; how the world oughtto be, or how it might be made better, is another. One way of responding to the world is 'descriptive'; the other way of responding is 'prescriptive'.
But the problem for social science in the real world is that facts cannot be separated from values. If we had no values, if we had no interest in value in the world, we would not be interested in any particular facts. We would not be struck by any particular facts as calling out for attention and demanding investigation. Although we are generally able to distinguish statements that claim to 'describe' how the world is from statements that 'prescribe' how the world ought to be, we cannot extract facts from values in any pure way. We cannot put all our values to one side in order to observe the world purely as a set of facts, undistorted by our frames of perception and feeling about what is right and wrong with the world. Social facts are meaningful to us only insofar they are value-laden, and we only come to be engaged with these facts insofar as we have values about how the world ought to be or ought not to be.
This explains why researchlnP facts b s t always produces a diversity of points . .
of vlew, w h~v t e n c o r n w~t h one another. Different social parties have different and often conflicting values about how the world should be, and different parties struggle with one another for the most authoritative account of the events and issues of the day. In the case at hand, numerous accounts exist of the causes of the Holocaust, and a broad spectrum of contestedviews reign about the causes and consequences of the founding of the state of Israel. Social science therefore has to consider a diversity of accounts, which very frequently turn out to be backed up by different sets of reasons worthy of consideration in their own right. In conseauence. it is often verv difficult. if not imnossible. to s p e a k any one r l p h t s w e r rn the studv ' .
.
of social affairs, This raises a profound problem. -search is possible only from value-laden points of view. how can r w c h be 'obiective'? How can there be agreement about the accuracv. validitv. or insight of anv articular ~i e c e of research? There are ways of answering this question which need not lead us to think that value conflict is fatal for the possibility of validity in research. If facts cannot be separated from values. ~t does not follow that evldence about social life cannot be collected. analvsed. and reted In t -and methodical ways, The events of the Holocaust and the Nakba are both capable of being submitted to transparent techniques of scrutiny-for example: techniques of analysing documents and statistics, interviewing of witnesses, and the like-and although many different accounts of these events still remain, and are still bound to remain, it does not follow that no valid knowledge can be established about them. Furthermore, & imnossihilitv of sevarating facts from values does not mean that r e s e a r c h e r s o t realisticallv aim to work out ~rocedures bv which disagreements can be d out W n a l l y debated, If I am able to show you m a r i v e at my position,
. . reasoaq for & sten ng to vou how I believe t w n s to account b r the matter and if you are able to do the same. we at least have s for discuswhich we can develon fu . .
rther through -continued crlticd communication.Value conflict neednot therefore entail that any statement by a party to a discussion has to be deemed as good as another, or that no agreement or no mutual critical discussion of any kind is possible. And it certainly does not follow that someone who denies that the Holocaust or the Nakba tookplace maintains as valid a position as someone who demonstrates that they did, by adducing evidence and methodically examining and explaining this evidence. Objectivity therefore remains a realistic and rationally desirable goal for research. But it is important to emphasize that obiectivitv need not be seen as the onlv or ultimate ma1 oy motive of researcLDifferent schools of social theory take differing views about the purpose . . and relative importance of objectivity. Some schools view it m end -while others tend to view it as a means towards other. m e vractical en&-such as social justice and *emancipation, or liberation from oppression. In general, schools that subordinate obiectivitv to the D ursuit of moral and nolitical ends of social a are described as havine a *normative orientation of thoueht. The word 'normative' here refers to attitudes that give priority to the 'ought' above the 'is', to determining how the world should be made better, rather than solely to observing how it Is. W will encounter many examplesof such attitudes in the course of this book. nut it should be stressed that nurner- 
